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 Effective Participation of Vulnerable Accused Persons: Case Management, Court 
Adaptation and Rethinking Criminal Responsibility 
Felicity Gerry and Penny Cooper 
This paper explores recent international developments in judicial case 
management for vulnerable accused persons in adversarial trials. The 
authors discuss the definition of “vulnerable” and include examples 
of adaptations to the traditional adversarial process and appellate 
decisions. The authors emphasise the importance of specialist legal 
representation. They conclude that not only is it necessary for there 
to be bespoke, procedural adjustments in appropriate cases but also 
for there to be a fundamental review of laws which may be 
inappropriately criminalising certain vulnerable accused persons.  
INTRODUCTION 
Research and practice developments around judicial case management are slowly 
shifting the criminal justice process in relation to vulnerable suspects and 
defendants. In addition, in Europe the effective participation of vulnerable suspects 
has some significant impetus now that state parties must comply with the 
requirements of the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)1 
including the access to justice and reasonable accommodation requirements. A 
critical analysis of the current position of adjusting adversarial trial procedures in 
the context of vulnerable accused persons exposes the need for careful case 
preparation. This includes attention to how an accused person’s vulnerability is 
relevant to investigatory interviews, decisions to prosecute, fitness to participate in 
the trial, some currently available defences and the accused’s presentation in court. 
However, fair trials not only depend on proper arrangements that take into account 
the vulnerability of the accused in order to remove barriers to their effective 
participation, but also need to ensure that vulnerable people are not 
inappropriately the subject of criminalisation.  
 This article seeks to offer practical insight into the adaptation of court processes 
to accommodate persons with vulnerabilities accused of a crime and also to 
highlight how modern understanding of cognitive function and mental disability 
requires a rethink of criminal law concepts of responsibility. Vulnerability is rightly a 
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contested concept2 since vulnerabilities are many and varied. The authors suggest 
that modern understanding of physical and mental disability and cognitive function, 
particularly those with reduced IQ and/or who have an Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD) should lead to not only procedural adaptation but a re-determination of the 
concepts of criminal responsibility, towards fundamental change in criminal justice 
systems.  
THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM 
Criminal justice is a process in which the defendant is required to make a series of 
usually irrevocable decisions such as whether to answer questions, plead guilty or 
give evidence.3 It is not a tactical exercise nor should it be dictated by fear of being 
misunderstood or of not being able to understand what is being said at trial. The 
overriding objective of any criminal justice system must be acquitting the innocent 
and convicting the guilty.4 In England and Wales this is enshrined in r 1.1 of the 
Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 (UK).5 It follows that to ensure this objective is 
maintained in cases involving vulnerable people, there needs to be an 
understanding of the particular complexities for those with vulnerabilities in an 
adversarial system. Although there should also be a clear and understandable 
definition of who is deemed “vulnerable” in the criminal justice system, recent 
appeal cases demonstrate that such clarity and understanding is not 
readily achieved in practice, at least in the jurisdiction of England and Wales.6 
 Gooding has argued for a human rights-based approach to supporting 
individuals with cognitive disabilities in the criminal justice system in the context of 
fitness to plead.7 The approach over the last six years of developing toolkits for The 
Advocate’s Gateway in the UK has been to encourage advocates to use 
communication practices informed by relevant research and taking into account 
specific vulnerabilities of an individual. Thus, the focus is on how to give a particular 
defendant the best opportunity to have access to justice through communication 
and special adaptations of court procedures. This accommodates both a human 
rights-based approach and common law concepts of fairness.8 Here, in using the 
label “vulnerability” we do no more than summarise the many and varied issues 
that may affect access to justice for an individual accused of a crime. In using the 
term “mental vulnerability” we encompass the concepts of mental and intellectual 
impairments in the CRPD but take a wider view which may encompass trauma or 
other, as yet undefined, vulnerabilities that might affect an individual’s ability to be 
treated fairly or with understanding.  
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 At the suspect stage, police interview procedures with vulnerable people may 
impact on the admissibility of suspect interviews or the drawing of an adverse 
inference from silence (in jurisdictions where the right to silence has been 
abrogated). The taking of client instructions might be affected by the failure to 
identify vulnerability. Knowledge of a suspect’s vulnerability might also be relevant 
to a decision to prosecute. Case preparation where the defendant has a recognised 
vulnerability might include the need for expert evidence on fitness to plead, 
insanity or automatism and/or (in a homicide) partial defences of diminished 
responsibility and loss of control/provocation. Modern approaches should also 
include evaluation of the defendant’s presentation at trial and whether the court 
process itself needs to be adjusted to accommodate a disability or other 
vulnerability. Particular conditions might also affect mitigation and 
sentencing/disposal. These are all processes with which criminal practitioners 
ought to be familiar.  
 However, in criminal proceedings, even in an adversarial system, there is 
increasing focus on and drive towards more efficient case management.9 The 
advent of legislation in England and Wales providing a statutory regime of “special 
measures” for vulnerable witnesses10 has inevitably brought about comparisons 
with provision for vulnerable defendants.11 The recognition of an accused person’s 
“mental vulnerability”12 and the adaptation of approaches and procedures required 
to manage cases involving vulnerable people has been driven by academic research 
and advocacy in criminal cases over two decades.  
 Justice system professionals and academics have worked together to produce 
research and practice informed “toolkits” for The Advocate’s Gateway.13 Those 
toolkits have now been adopted in criminal practice directions14 and in the family 
courts15 in England and Wales. A recent Scottish High Court Practice Direction on 
taking evidence from vulnerable witnesses in criminal cases also recommends their 
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use.16 The Advocate’s Gateway Toolkit 17 also sets out necessary approaches in civil 
proceedings in England and Wales.17 The Advocate’s Gateway material 
has also been referenced in Australia in the State of Victoria’s Disability Access 
Bench Book.18 
THE CRPD 
There is now a wealth of literature on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) which recognises the effect it has had to reframe the needs and 
concerns of persons with disabilities in terms of human rights, often expressed as 
“a paradigm shift”, reflecting progressive attitudes and approaches to persons with 
disabilities.19 It moves away from the medical model of disability which views 
people with disabilities as objects (of suffering, treatment, management, 
protection, charity and sometimes pity and fear), and towards the social model of 
disability which regards people with disabilities as subjects of the full range of 
human rights on an equal basis with others, and where people’s capacity to make 
decisions is presumed. The Convention requires practical measures and is enforced 
through reporting and complaints mechanisms. It is a valuable tool for persons with 
vulnerabilities to use to argue for better case management and special adaptations 
to court processes.20 Access to justice must, in this context, mean the ability to seek 
and obtain an effective remedy for a violation of a person’s rights or fundamental 
freedoms. The right to participate effectively is an important aspect coupled with 
the right to a fair trial reinforced by a number of international instruments and is 
expected in a common law system.  
CASE MANAGEMENT 
Victims’ rights have gained greater recognition in recent years with some significant 
protections, particularly for the vulnerable and traumatised witnesses through 
special measures. The framing of the context for suspects with similar 
vulnerabilities is weaker and still sits in the context of trial procedure rather than 
independent rights to be promoted.  
 Directive (EU) 2016/800 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
May 2011 provides procedural safeguards for children who are suspects or accused 
persons in criminal proceedings or subject to a European arrest warrant: the 
Directive establishes minimum rules on the protection of procedural rights of 
children who are suspects or accused persons.21 In relation to vulnerable adults, the 
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Council of the European Union adopted a Resolution on a Roadmap for 
strengthening the procedural rights of all suspected or accused persons in criminal 
proceedings in 2009.22 Some procedural rights have been adopted through the 
following Directives:  
 2010/64/EU23 on interpretation and translation;  
 2012/13/EU24 on right to information;  
 EU 2013/48/EU25 on access to a lawyer and having persons informed of 
arrest; and  
 2016/343/EU26 on strengthening the presumption of innocence and the right 
to be present at trial.  
 These are framed in the Roadmap as “measures” which included safeguards 
such as interpretation, translation, information, legal advice, legal aid, 
communication with relatives and, importantly, special safeguards for vulnerable 
suspects.27 Those special safeguards appear to equate to the adaptation to court 
processes engendered by the rise in “special measures” for vulnerable witnesses. In 
England and Wales those safeguards have been driven not by rights-based 
discourse but by concepts of “case management” which have gained momentum 
through the criminal procedure rules.28 In this context, the line between an 
adversarial system and an inquisitorial system may appear very faint indeed. 
Johnston has commented that this departure from traditional adversarial processes 
has shifted to a new form of process, driven by a managerial agenda focused on 
advanced case preparation but capable of accommodating the need for access to 
justice for vulnerable witnesses.29 
 In Australia, there are legislative procedures for vulnerable witnesses and 
guidance, particularly to accommodate vulnerable Aboriginal people. In Victoria, 
the Judicial College of Victoria has produced a Bench Book on how to approach the 
situation facing people with disabilities in court using CRPD terminology:30 
                                                          
22
 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural 
rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings.  
23
 Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the 
right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings. 
24
 Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right 
to information in criminal proceedings. 
25
 Directive 2013/48/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2013 on the 
right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and in European arrest warrant proceedings, and 
on the right to have a third party informed upon deprivation of liberty and to communicate with 
third persons and with consular authorities while deprived of liberty. 
26
 Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at 
the trial in criminal proceedings. 
27
 Suzan Van Der Aa, “Variable Vulnerabilities? Comparing the Rights of Adult Vulnerable Suspects 
and Vulnerable Victims under EU Law” (2016) 7 New Journal of EU Criminal Law 39.  
28
 The Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2017 (UK), the Criminal Procedure (Amendment No 2) 
Rules 2017 (UK) <https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/criminal>. 
29
 Ed Johnston, “All Rise for the Interventionist: The Judiciary in the 21st Century” (2016) 80(3) 
Journal of Criminal Law 201. 
30
 Judicial College of Victoria, n 20. 
  
  
Courts can be a disabling environment, requiring targeted support and 
adjustments to ensure people with a disability can participate on an equal basis 
with others and realise their rights. This Bench Book recognises the important 
role of judicial officers in facilitating this and provides practical guidance on 
matters to consider when a party or witness has a disability. 
 The Bench Book represents excellent leadership on such issues for the rest of 
Australia but also risks confining adaptations to those who fall within a 
classification of disability.  
 In England and Wales, the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 remain focused on 
vulnerability and require “active” case management. This applies equally to 
witnesses and suspects. The 2015 Criminal Practice Direction requires the court  
  
to take 
“every reasonable step” to encourage and facilitate the attendance of witnesse
s and to facilitate the participation of any person, including the defendant … 
This includes enabling a witness or defendant to give their best evidence, and 
enabling a defendant to comprehend the proceedings and engage fully with his 
or her defence. The pre‐trial and trial process should, so far as necessary, be 
adapted to meet those ends.31 
 
 It follows that individuals will vary hugely in their needs, wishes and preferences 
and any adjustments made must be tailored to respond to these individual 
requirements. Rule 3.2 states that 
“many other people giving evidence in a criminal case, whether as a witness or defe
ndant, may require assistance” thus requiring parties to be alert to potential 
“hidden” vulnerabilities that may not be immediately apparent.32 The mantra is 
“Better Case Management”.33 The expectation is that parties cooperate with each 
other in the very early stages of every case so that the relevant issues can be 
identified at early short hearings to assist the court to make the appropriate 
directions for an effective trial.34  
 Ideally courts would prioritise cases in which either a witness or a defendant is 
vulnerable. In England and Wales, protocols exist for the expediting of cases where 
the witness is very young35 or fast-tracking where there are third party disclosure 
                                                          
31
 Criminal Practice Directions [2015] EWCA Crim 1567, 3D.2. 
32
 See Penny Cooper and Clare Allely, “You Can’t Judge a Book by Its Cover: Lawyers’ Evolving 
Professional Responsibilities and Judgecraft when a Party has Asperger’s Syndrome” (2017) 68(1) 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 35. See also The Advocate’s Gateway, “Toolkit 10 – Identifying 
Vulnerability in Witnesses and Parties and Making Adjustments” (20 March 2017). 
33
 Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, “Better Case Management Newsletter (11)” (5 October 2016) 
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/better-case-management-newsletter-11/>. 
34
 Criminal Practice Directions [2015] EWCA Crim 1567, 3A.12. 
35
 For example, in accordance with the Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, “Judicial Protocol: Expedition 
of Cases Involving Witnesses Under 10 Years” (13 March 2015) 
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/judicial-protocol-expedition-of-cases-involving-
witnesses-under-10-years/>. 
  
issues.36 A crucial element in relation to vulnerable witnesses or defendants is a 
Ground Rules Hearing (GRH) where the judge can hear evidence and lay down 
procedural requirements for a particular hearing.37 The GRH approach has spread 
to Northern Ireland, Australia and most recently New Zealand.38  
 In England and Wales the GRH includes the use of intermediaries to assist with 
communication where an intermediary has been appointed. Assessment by an 
intermediary should be considered for any child or young person who seems  
 <blockquote> 
liable to misunderstand questions or to experience difficulty expressing 
answers, including those who seem unlikely to be able to recognise a 
problematic question (such as one that is misleading or not readily understood) 
and those who may be reluctant to tell a questioner in a position of authority if 
they do not understand.39 
</blockquote> 
  Applications for intermediaries are dealt with on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account the particular needs of the person and the context of the case. The 
fact that an intermediary was not present during an interview does not mean that 
an intermediary is not required for trial.40 There is a similar intermediary scheme in 
Northern Ireland41 and a limited similar system for child witnesses in New South 
Wales.42 However, save for in Northern Ireland, there is no legislative provision in 
force allowing for a defendant to be assisted by an intermediary.43 Although it is 
accepted in England and Wales that the court may use its inherent powers to direct 
the appointment of an intermediary, there is no presumption that it will do so, 
even where it is accepted that an intermediary would improve the trial process.44 
There is a good argument for intermediaries for vulnerable defendants under the 
EU Roadmap. Unfortunately, while the courts recognise the need for adaptation 
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(even when an intermediary is not available)45 the provision of intermediaries for 
vulnerable defendants in England and Wales is framed in the criminal practice 
direction as “rare” or “extremely rare”,46 which has some illogicality and potential 
for unfairness.47  
 Nonetheless, it will be for the judge to decide in each case what adaptations are 
necessary and whether to grant the appointment of an intermediary.48 Whether 
this is an issue of access to justice or trial management, it requires specialist 
advocates and judges.49 Assistance from an intermediary should not be granted if it 
is solely required to make up for the communicative shortcoming of the advocate.50 
As a case management exercise, a GRH may be ordered (and save in exceptional 
circumstances should be ordered) by the judge in order to give directions for the 
fair treatment and effective participation of vulnerable witnesses and defendants at 
trial.51  
 Aside from limitations on the manner and scope of questioning, necessary 
adjustments to enable the vulnerable person effectively to participate in the trial 
process might include breaks, meeting advocates and the judge in advance, use of 
technology or non-verbal communication aids/tools.52 Where the defendant is a 
young person or has communication difficulties, their understanding of any 
explanations given should be checked.  
 The following are examples from The Advocate’s Gateway (numbered 1 to 3 
below) and the Equal Treatment Bench Book53 (numbered 4 to 6 below) for England 
and Wales. These examples are part of non-binding guidance and are based on 
examples of what has been regarded as good practice in a given case. It is stressed 
that these are case specific examples and are used to illustrate the degree to which 
courts have adapted traditional procedures when necessary.  
(1)  Allowing “Post-it” notes in the dock to help a defendant who has difficulty 
understanding the order of events – these are stuck onto the glass screen and show 
the order of events during the trial and can be changed around and also removed 
once a particular event has happened.54 
(2) Out of court hours, [a defendant] being allowed to practise walking towards the 
witness box while his favourite music was played, then answering questions from 
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the box about his favourite subject. This relaxed him and enabled him to give 
evidence from the witness box.55 
(3) Being allowed to give evidence with the witness box screened.56  
(4)  Seating a defendant with impaired vision near the jury while they were 
empanelled, to enable him to object to jurors if necessary; and seating a defendant 
with a hearing problem in the body of the court (such defendants have particular 
difficulty following proceedings from the dock because advocates speak with their 
backs to them). 
(5)  Agreeing that a defendant with mental health issues be given brief pauses 
during cross-examination to manage his emotional state and remain calm enough 
to respond to questions. 
(6) Allowing a defendant with autism to have quiet, calming objects in the dock to 
help him to pay attention. 
 It is now understood that the court has a continuing duty to ensure that the 
defendant understands what is happening.57 The fundamental principle is to enable 
vulnerable people to give the best evidence they can. This may mean departing 
radically from traditional cross-examination and thus changing traditional practices 
often regarded as hallmarks of the adversarial process while still testing the 
evidence. The changes in process are the subject of scrutiny in the sense that where 
any restrictions are imposed on cross-examination, they must be clearly defined 
and explained to the jury at trial by the judge.58 
SPECIALISED KNOWLEDGE 
Expert evidence will be necessary where the nature and impact of the defendant’s 
vulnerability is outside the experience and knowledge of the fact-finder, whether 
that is a jury or a judge.59 In Australia the Uniform Evidence provisions reflect this in 
concepts of specialised knowledge.60 The obtaining of expert assessments may be 
unarguable in complex mental disability, but understanding a borderline learning 
disability may not be specialised in the sense that it may be within the experiences 
of a jury.61 As with suggestibility,62 and where the learning disability is more 
profound and relates to an issue in the trial (such as duress), expert opinion is likely 
to be relevant and admissible.63 It is for this reason such cases require specialist 
advocates who are trained to identify when a vulnerable person needs to be 
medically assessed by an expert particularly as, in some cases, the accused will have 
multiple difficulties relevant to the issues and to meaningful understanding of the 
trial process.64  
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 The case management procedures in England and Wales provide for advance 
notification of expert evidence65 and duties fall to both parties to identify a 
participant’s mental vulnerability at the earliest opportunity,66 although for defence 
advocates, exercising judgment on disclosure of expert reports can be a difficult 
decision where complex vulnerabilities can also disclose behaviour that may go to 
state of mind for the offence.67 Expert evidence may therefore be relevant to 
understand the vulnerability generally, to the issues at trial (such as fitness to 
plead, and defences or partial defences) and to explain any atypical presentation of 
a vulnerable individual at court.68 For example, for a defendant with ASD, proper 
explanation to the fact-finders about any unusual traits or pre-occupations could 
avoid prejudice against the defendant on account of the way he or she appears or 
answers questions.69 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
The development of toolkits for advocacy with vulnerable people and the 
management of such cases have created a change in the way that trial processes 
are approached in England and Wales. Australia is beginning to follow, certainly in 
relation to witnesses, although practice in relation to suspects differs. In the 
Northern Territory of Australia, for example, there are some standing orders for 
police officers for communication with Aboriginal suspects based on the guidance 
in R v Anunga70 but no statutory code of practice to regulate the detention, 
treatment and questioning of suspects. Across Australia there are also protocols for 
lawyers which deal with some specific vulnerabilities and guidance through defence 
organisations. However, the exercise of judicial discretion is still largely only used 
for poorly conducted interviews71 and the wider issues of suspect and defendant 
vulnerability at trial are not yet being formally widely addressed from either an 
access to justice or rights-based perspective.72  
 Equally, even in England and Wales where the toolkits have had such influence, 
there remains much to be done with respect to addressing criminal responsibility in 
the context of a defendant’s mental vulnerability. The test of the defendant’s 
criminal liability for the alleged offence may be based on objective and/or 
subjective criteria. The former is much more resistant to accommodating particular 
vulnerability. It is axiomatic that state of mind is relevant to intention. Recklessness 
may have both subjective and objective criteria and even negligence tests may 
require a comparative exercise with other people’s behaviour. This means that 
courts are often, but not always, required to consider the defendant’s own 
characteristics and this gives an impetus to consideration of criminal responsibility 
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when a defendant was mentally vulnerable at the time of the alleged offence. The 
defences of insanity and sane automatism, which arise out of mental vulnerability, 
create a complex area of law which the UK Law Commission has recognised as 
being in need of reform.73 Though the effects of long-term abuse have led to 
reduced liability, reducing murder to manslaughter in common law jurisdictions, 
formal legislative recognition of mental vulnerability has not been extended to 
other offences or defences.74 The Modern Slavery Act 2015 (UK) provides, in 
England and Wales, a defence for slavery or trafficking victims who commit an 
offence in certain circumstances, but the Court of Appeal recently refused to 
extend the defence of duress to human trafficking victims.75 No such protection for 
such victims applies in Australia at all, although there is an ongoing Senate 
inquiry.76 
 The adjustment of common law principles has been of particular concern where 
defendants have been diagnosed with ASD; the Court of Appeal in England and 
Wales has begun what we suggest is a process of re-evaluation:  
 In R v Reynolds,77 decided in England before provocation became “loss of 
control” under s 52 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (UK), the accused person 
was convicted of murdering with a claw hammer a pharmacist at the shop where 
he worked. He was 17 years old at the time.78 Sometime after conviction, experts 
diagnosed Asperger's Syndrome (a form of ASD) capable of amounting to an 
abnormality of mind within s 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 (UK). The Court of Appeal 
reduced his conviction to one of manslaughter.79  
 In R v Thompson80 and R v Stewart81 the defendants were diagnosed with 
Asperger’s Syndrome after conviction. The Court of Appeal recognised that 
evidence of the condition could have been relevant to the defendant’s alleged 
sexually motivated conduct and this evidence contributed to the quashing of 
convictions in both cases. It has been argued that a defendant’s ASD is similarly 
relevant when considering criminal liability for the downloading of child sexual 
abuse material.82 
                                                          
73
 Law Commission (UK), “Criminal Liability: Insanity and Automaton: A Discussion Paper” (23 July 
2013). 
74
 See, eg, R v GAC [2013] EWCA Crim 1472. 
75
 R v Joseph [2017] EWCA Crim 36. 
76
 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Inquiry into Establishing a 
Modern Slavery Act in Australia (commenced 15 February 2017). 
77
 R v Reynolds [2004] EWCA Crim 1834. 
78
 R v Reynolds [2004] EWCA Crim 1834, [6]. 
79
 R v Reynolds [2004] EWCA Crim 1834, [8]. 
80
 R v Thompson [2014] EWCA Crim 836. 
81
 R v Stewart (unreported, Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), 11 December 2015). 
82
 Mark Mahoney, “Asperger’s Syndrome and the Criminal Law: The Special Case of Child 
Pornography” (2009). See also Tony Attwood, Isabelle Henault and Nick Dubin, The Autism 
Spectrum, Sexuality and the Law (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2014) and Lawrence Dubin and Emily 
Horowitz, Caught in the Web of the Criminal Justice System: Autism, Developmental Disabilities, and 
Sex Offences (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2017).     
  
In R v Sultan83 Asperger’s Syndrome was relevant to a defendant’s reasonable belief 
in consent in an alleged rape. Although in B v The Queen84 this was qualified on the 
basis that  
unless and until the state of mind amounts to insanity in law, then under the 
rule enacted in the Sexual Offences Act beliefs in consent arising from 
vulnerabilities such as delusional psychotic illness or personality disorders must 
be judged by objective standards of reasonableness [so that a] delusional belief 
in consent, if entertained, would be by definition irrational and thus 
unreasonable, not reasonable.85 
 While there is a clear difference between cases involving objective or subjective 
state of mind,86 the path to wider recognition of vulnerabilities to criminal 
responsibility has begun.87 The issue is whether the vulnerability impairs 
functioning, not the label, and discussion at legislative level needs to begin. In R v 
Smith,88 the Court of Appeal reaffirmed its view that the overriding objective 
requires issues of mental vulnerability to be dealt with at trial and not left for an 
appellate decision.  
 For nations to comply with their obligations towards people with vulnerabilities, 
such issues should not be left to piecemeal decisions in criminal cases but ought to 
be the subject of wholesale reform. Fair procedures will count for nothing if the 
process to determine criminal liability does not react to modern knowledge of 
cognitive function, mental illness and other disabilities which impact on state of 
mind.89 This requires a framework for a multilayered approach to defending a 
vulnerable person that goes far beyond determination of fitness to plead and 
procedural adjustments such as the use of interpreters or intermediaries. This is an 
issue which goes beyond “Better Case Management”. It is an issue that suggests 
removal of certain cases from the system altogether through a recognition that 
some vulnerabilities do not and should not lead to criminalisation. 
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